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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
impartiality required by the Fourteenth Amendment does not depend
upon the subjective declarations of the individual jurors.4 0 Instead it
depends upon the common man's concept of fairness. It is vital that
the jury consider the case free from all prejudicial influences.
FRED RATHERT.
STATE NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE COMPENSATION FOR A PARTIAL TAKING OF
DEFENDANT'S AcCESS.-In 1959 the defendant leased land adjacent to a
major highway for the purpose of constructing a service station. Since
the highway and land were on the same level, patrons could easily use
the entire 300 foot frontage of the tract. A secondary road along one
side of the acreage provided auxiliary access. In 1960 the State informed
the defendant that an improved highway was to replace the older way.'
The new road was to be wider, increase the grade, and utilize a traffic
divider.2 Because of the increase in grade and the resultant limitation
of access, the State proposed to build an approach to the tract. The de-
fendant's request for more than one such approach was denied. The
State instituted a condemnation proceeding against the defendant which
resulted in an award for land and access taken. However, the court re-
fused to instruct the jury that they could not consider the loss to de-
fendant's business due to the difficulty of traffic in crossing the center
divider except as the loss might affect the decline in value of the remain-
ing property. On appeal by the State to the Montana Supreme Court,
held, reversed and remanded. The refused instructions should have been
given since, without them, the jury could not have adequately deter-
mined the declining value of the land. Also, the State need only pay
compensation for access when it has been completely denied or the re-
maining access is unreasonable. State Highway Comm'r v. Keneally,
384 P.2d 770 (MNont. 1963).
Although, in the instant case, the court is quite correct in its final
conclusion, it is believed that some foundation for the decision should
have been laid. The construction of the interstate highway system in
this State will undoubtedly increase the probability of litigation regard-
ing the character of access and the procedure by which it is taken. Thus,
such a foundation would have been of considerable value as a guide in
deciding future cases dealing with the same subject.
The rights possessed by an owner of land abutting a highway re-
ceived little attention prior to the development of the "super" or "con-
trolled access" highways.3 With the advent of such highways, however,
"United States v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885, 908 (D. Vt. 1962).
'Although the highway in the instant case was not of the controlled access variety,
the issues posed are the same as if it had been.
2This device would eliminate potential customers wishing to make a left turn across
the road to the station, except for those who turned left at the frontage road at
which point the divider had a separation.
'One of the first recorded decisions is found in an 1839 Kentucky case. The Lexington
& Ohio By. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana. 289 (Ky. 1839). English law on the subject
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considerable litigation on the character and extent of these rights arose,
the resulting decisions often being quite contradictory. The situation
has been aptly described by the United States Supreme Court :4
The right of an owner of land abutting on public high-
ways has been a fruitful source of litigation in the courts of all
the States, and the decisions have been conflicting, and often in
the same State irreconcilable in principle. The courts have modi-
fied or overruled their own decisions, and each State has in the
end fixed and limited, by legislation or judicial decision, the
rights of abutting owners in accordance with its own view of
the law and public policy.
The landowner's right of access to a highway is usually viewed as
a property right5 although the courts are not entirely in accord as to
the character of the "right". In some instances access is characterized
as a mere license from the state to the individual which allows him to
leave his land and travel elsewhere.6 At other times it is considered
an easement.7 A third approach, although infrequently employed, de-
fines access as the enjoyment of two licenses: the first, in conjunction
with the public, is the right to use the highway generally; the other is
the license of direct access. If there is any change of position because
of the second license, it becomes, in essence, an easement, irrvocable and
enforcible in equity.8 It is obvious this latter view is simply a combina-
tion of the two theories earlier described. Whether access is character-
ized as an easement, a license, or the enjoyment of two licenses depends
upon the facts of the particular situation and the objectives the indivi-
dual courts are trying to reach.
In determining the extent of the right of access, the generally ac-
cepted rule is that an abutter does not have the right of ingress
and egress at every point along his frontage but only a right of reason-
able access.9 "Reasonableness", say the courts, is determined with re-
'Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1906); Clarke, The Limited-Access Highway,
27 WASH. L. REV. 111, 115 (1952).
5Access is a property right. 25 Am. Jun. Highways § 154 (1940); 39 C.J.S. Highways
§ 141 (1944); Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal. App. 2d 180, 210 P.2d 717 (1949),
chnider v. State, 231 P.2d 177 (Cal. 1951). Access has also been called an "ease-
ment appurtenant" with the individual holding the servient estate while the state
holds the dominate estate. The destruction of such an easement requires compensa-
tion. 28 C.J.S. Easements § 1-4 (1941). SMITH, SURVEY OP THE LAW O REAL PROP-
ERTY, ch. 14, 259 (1956); 25 Am. JUR. Highways § 154 (1940); 39 C.J.S. Highways
§ 141 (1944). Further, the right of access is not limited to the owner of the land,
but accrues to his patrons and clients as well. Longenecker v. Wichita Ry. & Light
Co., 80 Kan. 413, 102 Pac. 492, 496 (1909).
6In Ark. State Highway Comm'n. v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 728 (1960),
the court stated there was no damage to the property right of ingress and egress for
there was an alternate access available though it was more than one mile away. A
similar case is Transylvania University v. Lexington, 38 Am. Dec. 173 (1842), where
a college was allowed to close a street running through the main part of its campus
over the objection of the city because there was other access.
7Access as an easement is held by a majority of the courts. See e.g., People v. Ricci-
ardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); State ex ret. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho
269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958); McMoran v. State, 55 Wash. 2d 37, 345 P.2d 598 (1959).
'RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 519(4) & 524 (1944); 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 429
at 521 (1952); 109 U. PA. L. REV. 120, 124 (1960).
'See note 3 supra.
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gard to the circumstances of each situation.'0 Nevertheless, when there
is a material impairment of access a "taking" or a "damage" can be said
to have resulted for which compensation may be allowed."
A state may "take" property in two different ways: (1) through
an eminent domain proceedings, or (2) through the use of a State's
police power. If there is a taking by the employment of eminent do-
main, compensation is required by law.' 2 However, if the taking comes
under the theory of a State's police power, no payment is necessary.
13
The use of police power is rationalized on the ground that an indi-
vidual, as a member of society, should be counted upon to bear a reason-
able cost when there is an improvement that will benefit both him and
his fellow citizens.' 4 The concept is imparted in the phrase, damnum
absque injuria, which indicates that an individual's interest must give
way to accommodate the public although there is no compensatory pay-
ment. 15
1In Iowa State Highway Comm'n. v. Smith 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755, 760 (1957),
it was declared the commission is ''entitled to deference because of its superior know-
ledge of highways and traffic matters.'' However, the decision must still turn on
the particular facts of the situation. In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway
Purposes, 93 Ohio App. 179, 112 N.E.2d 411 (1952). Smith v. State Highway
Comm'n, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P.2d 259 (1959).
"In determining compensation where a deprevation of private property has occurred,
states seem to follow one of two rules, depending on whether their constitution
refers to the requirement of "taking" of private property or simply the ''damag-
ing" or "injuring" of private property. In the first instance there must be a
literal, physical taking, whereas in the latter case all there need be is some damage
or injury. Jurisdictions which fall into the first category have generally followed
what is called the Massachusetts rule. See, e.g., Thompson v. Androscoggin River Im-
provement Co., 54 N.H. 545 (1874); Selden v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457
(1891); McCullough v. Campbellsport, 123 Wis. 334, 101 N.W. 709 (1904). Cases
exemplary of the second rule are: Montgomery v. Townsend, 80 Fla. 489 (1886);
Svanson v. Omaha, 38 Neb. 550, 57 N.W. 289 (1894). Also it has been indicated there
is no "redress" under the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution as applied
to the States. Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1906). See generally, 2 NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN Ch. IV particularly at § 6.38 - 6.441 (3rd ed. 1950). MONT.. CONST.
art. III, § 14 provides-'" Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation having been first made to or paid into court for the
owner." (emphasis added) Thus it becomes apparent that the distinction existing
between taken and damaged is almost negligible in this state, as both words are used.
"See notes 4 and 10 supra.
"'The distinction between eminent domain and police powers has been made in a
number of cases: Dallas v. Hallum, 285 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. 1955); State v. Fox, 53
Wash. 2d 216, 332 P.2d 943 (1958). State ex ret. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318,
350 P.2d 988 (1960) state there is compensation because of an eminent domain action,
whereas in State Highway Comm'n. v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 728
(1960), there is no compensation because police power was used. A comprehensive
treatment of these two cases may be found in 109 U. PA. L. REv. 120 (1960).
4The general considerations supporting this view are the protection of the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare. With regard to access specifically it is
said a governmental authority has "the power to regulate, at least reasonably, in
the public interest and without illegal discrimination, the extent of an abutter's
private right of access . . . ." 73 A.L.R.2d 640, 657 (1960); See also Wilson v. Al-
hambra, 158 Cal. 430, 111 Pac. 254 (1910) (where a city government was allowed to
make such regulation); State ex rel. Gibelin v. Dep't. of Highways, 200 La. 409,
8 So. 2d 71 (1942) (in which the state was allowed to make such regulation).
'11 Am. JuR. Constitutional Law § 266 (1937).
[Vol. 25,
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It becomes evident at this point that there is a conflict between public
and private rights. 16 Courts must balance the "relative interests" of the
parties involved so as to arrive at a just conclusion. In the final analysis
the only test will be the particular facts and circumstances of the case
supported by the court's ultimate objectives. 1'7 Underlying the entire
scheme, nonetheless, is the generally controlling policy commitment that
society is loath to make any one individual support an excessive public
burden without recompense.
The measure of damages in an eminent domain proceeding is nor-
mally represented by the decrease in the market value of the land due
to the taking. The usual way to decide the increment of decrease is to
find the difference between the past and present market value of the
land.'8 In Montana the law is controlled by a statute which in effect
states the present-past test.'9 What to consider in determining the mar-
ket value is, of course, the question.
20
The Montana Supreme Court has held that damages which are too
"contingent," "speculative" and "remote" may not be regarded in com-
puting market value, 21 and further that the myriad of elements com-
prising the market value of land are not to be considered separately,
but must be taken as a whole. 22 One may say, then, that in so far as the
impairment of access lessens the market value of the property, there
"The concepts of police power and eminent domain have rather weighty public policy
arguments behind them. On one side there is a definite public need for highway
improvements at the lowest cost possible. Also there is the belief that a property
owner cannot expect the status quo to remain the same indefinitely. On the other
side is the belief that the property owner has relied on his right of access in improv-
ing his property and that its taking without compensation could destroy him en-
tirely; or make dangerous "inroads" into the area of private property rights
generally. 109 U. PA. L. REV. 120, 123 n.8 (1960). Since most roads and streets
are constructed for the public good, it seems natural for the rights of the public
to supersede those of the private individual. Thus the private right of access is
enjoyed subject to the paramount right of the public to use and improve the street
or highway. LEWIs, EMINENT DOMAIN 125-126 (1888).
"Note that this test is the same as the one employed to determine the nature of the
property right of access.
182 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.441(11) (3rd ed. 1950).
"REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-9913:
For the purposes of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the summons, and its actual
value at that date shall be the measure of compensation of all property to be
actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but
injuriously affected . . . . (emphasis added)
The actual value, it seems, could only be ascertained by taking into consideration
the past and present value of the land.
nSee note 18 supra.
Lewis & Clark Co. v. Nett, 81 Mont. 261, 263 Pac. 418 (1928); State v. Bradshaw
Land & Livestock Co., 99 Mont. 95, 43 P.2d 674 (1935). In effect this position holds
there must be a damage to the present market value of the land if there is to be
any compensation.
2Wright v. Butte, 64 Mont. 362, 210 Pac. 78 (1922).
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should be compensation.2 3 On the other hand, courts have held that if
there is alternate access, there may be no compensation.
2 4
Though the impairment of access may be claimed as a damage to
the market value of the land in an eminent domain proceeding, the re-
routing of traffic may not.25 Such a re-routing is an element of the
State's police power. Nonetheless, when compensation is given on the
remainder of the property, as in the instant case, using the present-past
market value test, loss of business due to deviation of traffic is vicari-
ously considered and may have a direct effect upon that market value.
It is submitted that in the instant case the distinction between the
impairment of access and the diversion of traffic is theoretically de-
fensible, but, as a practical matter, is too subtle to be adequately handled
by a jury of lay persons. Viewing the situation realistically, the distinc-
tion should not be used except in cases in which only traffic diversion
is being claimed as the damage.
It is further submitted that courts have not made it clear whether
they characterize access as a license or easement and allow this deter-
mination to control the nature of the proceeding; or conversely,
whether the type of proceeding is defined and the nature of the property
right simply made to fit. It appears no general procedure prevails.
However, courts are more likely to decide the type of action before the
character of the property right if the character of the right is considered
at all.
HORTON B. KOESSLER.
JURIES ARE NOT CAPABLE TRIERS OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY OR
UNDUE INFLUENCE IN WILL CONTEST CASES.- The testator, a successful
opthalmologist, was married and had two sons aged 12 and 14 years.
Five years before his death, the testator's wife obtained an interlocu-
tory decree of divorce which precipitated from an intimate relationship
between the testator and his receptionist.
Mollandin v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 14 Fed. 394 (1882); Idaho & W.N.R.R. v. Nagle,
184 Fed. 598 (9th Cir. 1911); Lund v. Idaho & W.N.R.R. 50 Wash 574, 97 Pac. 665
(1908). All the decisions were made under constitutional provisions which provided
for both taking and damage. One court in determining compensation has said:
When . . . ingress and egress to abutting property has been destroyed or
substantially impaired he (the abutter) may recover damage therefore. The
damages may be merely nominal or they may be severe. Other means of
access . . . may be taken into consideration in determining the amount which
would be just under the circumstances. (citing cases) Other means of access
may mitigate damages (citing cases), but does not constitute a defense to
the action.
State v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988, 992 (1960).
24See note 12 supra. It is also interesting to note, if a new road is constructed where
none existed before and insufficient or no access is provided, there may be no claim
for compensation because there was no access prior to the construction of the road.
Schnider v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 439, 241 P.2d 1 (1952); see generally 43 A.L.R.2d
1068 (1955).
OSee generally, 73 A.L.R.2d 680 and following annotations. 118 A.L.R. 921 indicates
some contrary holdings which are in the minority.
[Vol. 25,
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